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Abstract 
The election of a socialist and pro-Russian candidate in December 2016 as president of 
Moldova marked a new turn in Moldovan politics. This election contrasts with the pro-
Western attitudes of the previous government. Governing instability in Moldova and 
changing international orientations of many prominent political actors, as emphasized 
by this article, are partly due to political alternative victories of parties supported by 
different social groups. Focusing on young people activism, this article underlines the 
differentiation between the political success of pro-Western parties, made possible by 
the street protests of April 2009, and the political failure of December 2016. The 
findings of this research may add a new explanation to Moldova's permanent instability. 
The factor we emphasize here is the change in political values, attitudes and actions due 
to profound generational transformations. Since democracy is a life-long learning 
process, a continuous updating, changing of beliefs and action strategies responding to 
the varying political environment, different generations rely not only on different past 
experiences, but on different adapting capacities, on different meanings given to rights 
and freedoms, social standards and economic conditions. 
 
Keywords: Moldova, street protests, elections, young people, democratization. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Moldova has found itself for many years at the crossroad between 
European integration and democratization and more authoritarian and non- 
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democratic regimes specific to some post-communist countries in the region, 
especially to Russia and Belarus. The fragile balance between timid 
democratization and an undemocratic oligarchical regime is a key figure, which 
makes Moldova an unconsolidated, unstable, and partial democracy. The aim of 
this article is to shed light on the causes of the fragile balance, and more 
specifically on the social forces that shape the timid democratization. It intends 
to address the issue of young people’s activism and to assess its importance for 
the fragile democratization in Moldova, where successive efforts for democratic 
consolidation have been undermined by more authoritarian episodes, and pro-
European association measures are quickly counterbalanced by pro-Russian 
attitudes and policies. Focusing on young people, the article underlines the 
contrast between their strong activism using social media channels and their 
inconsistent off-line mobilization when it comes to voting, as well as their scant 
voluntary engagement. 
The argument this article puts forward is that the weakness of the 
democratization process is explained by the opposition, on one hand between 
groups of young people, which become more and more politically active and 
visible, and on the other hand the rest of the population, which constitutes a 
more nostalgic electorate for the good old days of past socialism. The tension 
between a more westernized and civically active youth and more nostalgic pro-
communist older people seems to heavily influence the Moldovan political 
regime. Whereas the former are more visible in street protests and have proved 
capable to overthrow the Communist Party rule in April 2009, the latter express 
their political opinions at the polls. Merely visible, the latter form the bulk of an 
electorate sensible to social and economic issues, voting for the Communist 
party as the expression of the reminder of Soviet socialist times. The opposition 
between those two kinds of electorate is not accidental. As shown by solid 
survey data, the political split between the Communist party in power in 2009, 
and the young activists mobilized using the new social media, is by and large 
due to solid discrepancies between shared social and political values. In other 
words, the crucial protest outburst against the Communist party rule during the 
spring of 2009 is triggered by profound structural tensions. 
At the same time, the successful protest on the 5
th
 of April 2009 was not 
necessarily the turning point in Moldovan politics, but more a significant 
oscillation in regime type characteristics and stability, as it has been shown by 
the election of a Communist candidate as president in 2016. By focusing on the 
social forces that manifested during those days and on the social changes taking 
place since then, the current research may offer a more profound knowledge of 
the ongoing tensions and of the more recent configuration of the Moldovan 
political space. The online mobilization continues to be effective on the ground 
following the events in spring 2009, with young people supporting various 
candidates, including the Communist party candidates. However, the weak 
electoral participation of politically Western oriented young people undermines 
the chances of pro-Western political parties. This is in contrast with the 
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Communist party, which did not rely heavily on this kind of activists, and which 
is electorally supported by more conservative, especially less young nostalgic 
people. The conclusion is that young people, active on social media and fighting 
for a regime change, have to get engaged in politics on the ground, to be active 
in secondary organizations, which would impact the overall political culture on 
the long-run. Finally, they have to be electorally active, and thus be part of the 
general process of learning that democracy implies. 
 
 
Regime Transformation and Post-Communist Democratization 
 
During post-communism, transition outcomes are unpredictable. On the 
one hand, the political competition between elites and the distribution of power 
between the former communist and the new democratic elites would decide the 
path, with either non-democratic or democratic outcomes when the power is 
unequally distributed, and with unstable, unconsolidated, partial democracy, 
when the equal distribution of power between the old regime elites and its 
challengers occurs.
1
 On the other hand, not all citizens desire that their country 
turns into a complete democracy, fearing social costs that would exceed all 
political benefits. In other words, two logics are intertwined during transition, a 
political competition between actors, and long-lasting economic and social 
structures working as a constraining path dependency.
2
 Democratization, seen 
as a process that offers a predictable outcome should, therefore, be replaced by 
“regime transformation”, since the final outcome of this transformation is not 
known.
3
 This is especially true for the early stages of transition, when the 
competition between competing elites is not yet decided and when citizens have 
no clear idea about the process and its plausible outcomes. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, the regime transformation has mostly lead to consolidated 
democratic states, while in the former Soviet area most of the new regimes that 
emerged are partial and unstable democracies, in fact hybrid regimes that 
combine democratic and non-democratic features, with formally democratic 
institutions as multiparty elections set up in order to cover a profoundly 
authoritarian domination, which disregards human rights and abuses civil 
liberties.
4
 
                                               
1  Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative 
Transitions in the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 54, no. 2 (2002): 212-244. 
2  Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change,” The 
Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (2007): 908-926. 
3  William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: 
Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures,” International Political Science Review 22, 
no. 4 (2001): 303-320, 304. 
4  Joakim Ekman, “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analysing 
Hybrid Regimes,” International Political Science Review 30, no. 1 (2009): 7-31. 
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From a perspective that takes complex processes into account, we 
emphasize the importance of citizens’ support for democracy. We acknowledge 
that a democratic transition is more complex than initially assumed, combining 
a large array of internal and external factors that shape the regime 
transformation. Without disregarding external factors, we focus here on 
citizens’ democratic values as a crucial asset for democratization.
5
 On the one 
hand, it is necessary that several generations assimilate and practice democracy 
in order to have a consolidated democratic regime. On the other hand, it is by no 
means necessary that all particular transitions end in full democratic settings, 
meaning that full democratization might not be the final point of the transition 
between political regimes. Depending on the democratic lessons learned and on 
competing incentives, the new democratic regime might not be at all as 
permanent, stable or stationary as one might expect. This is to say that citizens 
may offer their support for the new democratic regime by continuously 
updating, modifying and balancing their initial beliefs, through a large series of 
successive experiences during the whole transition period.
6
 This type of 
evaluation is quite opposite to an idealistic definition of democracy, meaning 
that citizens make their mind by actually comparing real, vivid regimes, by 
comparing the existing democracy with the previous non-democratic regime. 
This may eventually impact on the definition they give to democracy itself, 
since the label of democracy may cover not only democratic values and 
procedures, civil rights and political freedoms, but also economic and social 
rights that have been emphasized by the former socialist regime.
7
 Returning to 
the previous regime or supporting another type of non-democratic regime (a 
strong leader or a military rule) is not at all a fiction, but the outcome of 
competing support strategies for regimes that have been already experienced by 
the people from a particular region. 
 
 
 
                                               
5  Christian Welzel, “Are Levels of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing 
Attainment and Sustainment Effects on Democracy,” International Political Science 
Review 28, no. 4 (2007): 397-424. 
6  Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian W. Haerpfer, Democracy and Its 
Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). 
7  Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “Remembering the bad old days: 
human rights, economic conditions, and democratic performance in transitional regimes,” 
European Journal of Political Research 36, no. 2 (1999): 155-174; Richard I. Hofferbert 
and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany,” 
International Political Science Review 22, no. 4 (2001): 363-378; Daniel Stockemer and 
Greg Elder, “Germans 25 years after reunification – How much to they know about the 
German Democratic Republic and what is their value judgment of the socialist regime,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48, nos. 2-3 (2015): 113-122. 
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Moldova between East and West 
 
Like other countries from the former Soviet area, Moldova experienced a 
mixed transition, where steps towards Western styled democratic regime 
transformation were soon followed by decisive setbacks, turning Moldova into 
an unstable, democratically unconsolidated, hybrid regime. As it was the case in 
Ukraine,
8
 citizens and political elites are undecided, balancing between post-
Soviet semi-authoritarianism and democratic openness, between Soviet 
nostalgia and the faith in Western integration.
9
 This balance that keeps Moldova 
in an uncertain state may polarize society and fuel diverging political solutions, 
especially when one notices the rather complicated geopolitical situation that 
severely impacts on Moldova’s statehood, with Transnistria turning into a de-
facto state.
10
 
The balance between Western integration and Soviet nostalgia is fueled 
by political uncertainty and social deprivation. It is worth mentioning that 
former Soviet citizens evaluate the legacy of communism and the benefits of 
post-communist transition differently, making the decision to head towards East 
or West much more difficult than it was for citizens of former communist states 
from Central and Eastern Europe.
11
 This is especially true today, when Russia 
itself managed to find a way to overcome the former communist regime settings 
and continue modernization under new circumstances, while keeping the 
memory of good old days alive.
12
 The current Russian modernization, being far 
away from the model of liberalization of market economy and full 
democratization, conceived as the revival of a great power based on its own 
political culture,
13
 is today an alternative to the more classical post-communist 
transition experienced by Central and Eastern European countries. Based on a 
different paradigm than the Western democratic model, Russian modernization 
                                               
8  Neil Munro, “Which Way Does Ukraine Face? Popular Orientations Toward Russia and 
Western Europe,” Problems of Post-Communism 54, no. 6 (2007): 43-58. 
9  Theodor Tudoroiu, “Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldova’s difficult quest for 
democracy,” Democratization 18, no. 1 (2011): 236-264. 
10  Oleh Protsyk, “Federalism and Democracy in Moldova,” Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 1 
(2005): 72-90; Oleh Protsyk, “Secession and hybrid regime politics in Transnistria,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45, no. 1-2 (2012): 175-182; Theodor Tudoroiu, 
“The European Union, Russia, and the Future of the Transnistrian Frozen Conflict,” East 
European Politics and Societies 26, no. 1 (2012): 135-161. 
11  Vladimir Gel’man, “Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire? Post-Soviet Regime Changes in 
Comparative Perspective,” International Political Science Review 29, no. 2 (2008): 157-180. 
12  Karen Dawisha, “Communism as a Lived System of Ideas in Contemporary Russia,” East 
European Politics and Societies 19, no. 3 (2005): 463-493. 
13  Markku Kivinen and Terry Cox, “Russian Modernisation – a New Paradigm,” Europe-
Asia Studies 68, no. 1 (2016): 1-19. 
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is taken into account by citizens from other post-Soviet republics, excluding the 
Baltic States, which already have chosen the exit from state socialism, 
integrating the political and economic Western system.
14
 
The impact of social transformations during transition on persistent 
Soviet nostalgia should not be underestimated.
15
 As mentioned above, the 
evaluation of democracy by ordinary people means not only subjectively 
measuring its performance, but comparing it with alternative regimes. From this 
perspective, Moldovan citizens not only have the opportunity to compare their 
post-communist transition with the past Soviet performance, but with the 
current Russian performance as well. From the first years of the post-
communist transition, the support for the new democratic regime in Russia and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States was marked by a downward trend, 
which was consistent during the first decade of regime transformation.
16
 This 
was mainly due to citizens’ dissatisfaction with the economy and the 
performance of state institutions. Compared with the micro-economy of the 
households and the macro-economy of the socialist states which were fully 
engaged in modernization processes, the post-communist social and economic 
situation is contrasting by the erosion of the social safety net, the strong decline 
of living standards and the social shock brought in by permanent unemployment 
and severe poverty.
17
 Moreover, these more personal threats to living standards 
have been accompanied by deep transformations at a more general, societal 
level. The first decade of transition has brought in an outburst in corruption and 
state-capture,
18
 with a serious increase in both ordinary crime and organized 
crime.
19
 
In Moldova, the alternative to the democratic transition, as it was 
experienced during the first years of post-communism, is therefore appealing. 
                                               
14  Rainer Kattel and Ringa Raudla, “The Baltic Republics and the Crisis of 2008-2011,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 3 (2013): 426-449. 
15  Liudmila Mazur, “Golden age mythology and the nostalgia of catastrophes in post-Soviet 
Russia,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 57, no. 3-4 (2015): 213-238. 
16  Christian W. Haerpfer, “Support for Democracy and Autocracy in Russia and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, 1992-2002,” International Political Science 
Review 29, no. 4 (2008): 411-432. 
17  Pamela Abbott, “Cultural Trauma and Social Quality in Post-Soviet Moldova and 
Belarus,” East European Politics and Societies 21, no. 2 (2007): 219-258; Ivan T. Berend, 
“Social shock in transforming Central and Eastern Europe,” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 40, no. 3 (2007): 269-280. 
18  Vladimir Shlapentokh, “Corruption, the power of state and big business in Soviet and 
post-Soviet regimes,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46, no. 1 (2013): 147-158. 
19  Ichiro Iwasaki and Taku Suzuki, “Transition strategy, corporate exploitation, and state 
capture: An empirical analysis of the former Soviet states,” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 40, no. 3 (2007): 393-422; Leslie Holmes, “Crime, organised crime 
and corruption in post-communist Europe and the CIS,” Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 42, no. 2 (2009): 265-287. 
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Russia managed to improve its status of great power, following decades of 
setbacks, and has the opportunity to propose its own economic and social model 
today. Russia not only managed to avoid political trouble, as experienced by 
other former Soviet republics in the aftermath of “colored revolutions”,
20
 but it 
successfully managed to prevent or destabilize countries,
21
 for example Georgia 
and the Ukraine, where such revolutions have occurred.
22
 Moreover, Russia 
currently offers the former Soviet republics the promise of a new political 
space, defined by special economic and cultural ties under the large umbrella of 
an Eurasian Union.
23
 We therefore understand the competitive definition of 
democracy
24
 as an open game between at least two major regime proposals, 
between democracy and its alternatives, a dictatorship, a military rule or a 
technocratic regime, or a combination of them, under the form of a revived 
Soviet-style regime. 
 
 
Age Groups and Types of Political Activism 
 
Despite its feeble civil society, weak democratic institutions, important 
social problems and structural development obstacles, Moldova did not turn into 
an authoritarian regime following its independence in 1991. By the contrary, 
Moldova is more pluralistic than many post-Soviet states. Against all odds, 
Moldova is a case of pluralism “by default”,
25
 where the political competition is 
mainly due to government polarization and state incapacity of monopolizing 
political control. As a failed authoritarian regime, Moldova is at the same time 
an unstable, undemocratic, hybrid regime. The balance between democratic 
progress and authoritarian consolidation is due to a series of factors, ranging 
                                               
20  Taras Kuzio, “Regime type and politics in Ukraine under Kuchma,” Communist and Post 
Communist Studies 38, no. 2 (2005): 167-190. 
21  Nicolay Petrov, Maria Lipman and Henry E. Hale, “Three dilemmas of hybrid regime 
governance: Russia from Putin to Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 1 (2014): 1-26; Robert 
Horvath, “Putin's ‘Preventing Counter-Revolution’: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the 
Spectre of Velvet Revolution,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 1 (2011): 1-25; Ammon Cheskin 
and Luke March, “State-society relations in contemporary Russia: new forms of political and 
social contention,” East European Politics 31, no. 3 (2015): 261-273. 
22  Valery Silitsky, “‘Survival of the fittest’: Domestic and international dimensions of the 
authoritarian reaction in the former Soviet Union following the colored revolutions,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 339-350. 
23  Michal Wawrzonek, “Ukraine in the ‘Grey Zone’ Between the ‘Russkiy Mir’and Europe,” 
East European Politics and Societies 28, no. 4 (2014): 758-770; Mitchell A. Orenstein, 
“Geopolitics of a Divided Europe,” East European Politics and Societies 29, no. 2 (2015): 
531-540. 
24  Rose, Mishler and  Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives. 
25  Lucan A. Way, “Weak States and Pluralism: The Case of Moldova,” East European 
Politics and Societies 17, no. 3 (2003): 454-482. 
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from ethnic divisions,
26
 to elite antagonism and individualism, in the context of 
the quest for political and national identity.
27
 The factor we emphasize here is 
the change in political values, attitudes and actions due to profound generational 
transformations. In other words, democracy is a life-long learning process, a 
continuous updating, changing of beliefs and action strategies responding to the 
varying political environment. In the process, different generations rely not only 
on different past experiences, but on different adapting capacities, on different 
meanings given to rights and freedoms, social standards and economic 
conditions. Therefore, it is by no means surprising that their political action 
would vary accordingly, including their support for the new democratic regime 
or for a non-democratic alternative. 
In the context of democratic transition in post-communist Europe, young 
people have not been at the heart of the scholarly investigation from the very 
beginning. It is true, they have not been a priority for parties and governments 
either. Young people continue to be seen, in modern democracies, as 
ambivalent when it comes to set up their political engagement profile. On the 
one hand, they are seen as more reluctant to participate in politics, as less 
engaged that their predecessors, as less interested in political matters. On the 
other hand, their essential involvement into more recent democratic or “color 
revolutions” made them a key element in both opposition and government 
political strategies.
28
 Young people are either an important asset for democracy, 
or potentially harmful contesters who could undermine authoritarian political 
regimes and who have to be seriously contained.
29
 As their Western 
counterparts, they are either seen as disengaged and disenfranchised,
30
 or 
engaged into more sophisticated new forms of political participation.
31
 
                                               
26  Federica Prina, “Linguistic Justice, Soviet Legacies and Post-Soviet Realpolitik: The 
Ethnolinguistic Cleavage in Moldova,” Ethnopolitics 14, no. 1 (2015): 52-71. 
27  Julien Danero Iglesias, “An Ad Hoc Nation: An Analysis of Moldovan Election 
Campaign Clips,” East European Politics and Societies 29, no. 4 (2015): 850-870. 
28  Taras Kuzio, “Civil society, youth and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions,” 
Communist and Post Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 365-386. 
29  Maya Atwal, “Evaluating Nashi's Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency and Activism,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 5 (2009): 743-758; Julie Hemment, “Soviet-Style 
Neoliberalism? Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and the Restructuring of Social Welfare in 
Russia,” Problems of Post-Communism 56, no. 6 (2009): 36-50; Maya Atwal and Edwin 
Bacon, “The youth movement Nashi: contentious politics, civil society, and party 
politics,” East European Politics 28, no. 3 (2012): 256-266. 
30  Shakuntala Banaji, “The trouble with the civic: a snapshot of young people’s civic and 
political engagements in twenty-first-century democracies,” Journal of Youth Studies 11, 
no. 5 (2008): 543-560. 
31  Yaojun Li and David Marsh, “New Forms of Political Participation: Searching for Expert 
Citizens and Everyday Makers,” British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (2008): 
247-272; Jeffrey Scott Juris and Geoffrey Henri Pleyers, “Alter-activism: emerging 
cultures of participation among young global justice activists,” Journal of Youth Studies 
12, no. 1 (2009): 57-75. 
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Judging by their political action, young people in post-communist Europe 
seem to differ from their predecessors. They seem to engage less in 
conventional action and to favor a more unconventional political action, such as 
mass rallies, boycotts and street protests, by using new, unconventional 
communication channels. In a very narrow span of time, they practically seem 
to have condensed the Western experience of changing patterns of political 
action. It is worth noticing that it took rather long time to Western citizens to 
move from the classical types of political action (voting and party membership) 
to unconventional participation.
32
 And this is not specific to post-communist 
countries. It has been well documented, that people who engage in civic and 
political activities, in both developed and developing countries, are frequent 
users of social media. The means by which social media can influence 
collective actions are providing mobilization information and news not 
available in other media, facilitating the coordination of demonstrations, 
allowing users to join political causes, and creating opportunities to exchange 
opinions with other people.
33
 
However, the distinction between conventional and unconventional 
participation, especially that driven by on-line mobilization, should be regarded 
with caution. On the one hand, the rapid expansion of political activities forces 
the re-evaluation of the way political participation is defined. In this context, 
neither nominal, nor deductive analyses seem to help evaluate the modes of 
participation, pushing toward the extensive use of purely subjective definitions. 
That is why scholars make efforts to revise and refine conceptual problems, by 
providing systematic criteria in order to establish valid measures.
34
 Despite this 
effort, doubt persists about some forms of participation, especially regarding 
digitally network participation and its political or non-political character. 
Defining political participation thus remains a task of pinpointing an elusive 
target.
35
 On the other hand, the values, motivations and political resources of 
young people change in a way that makes clear distinctions less effective. The 
motivation of protesters in the streets of Chișinău might be related to deep 
frustration regarding the inertia of the political system and the lagging in 
adopting more democratic measures. At the same time, young people in 
                                               
32  Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western 
Democracies (London: Sage, 1979); Pippa Norris, Stefaan Walgrave and Peter van Aelst, 
“Who demonstrates: anti-state rebels, or conventional participants? Or everyone?” 
Comparative Politics 37, no. 2 (2005): 251-275. 
33  Sebastian Valenzuela, “Unpacking the Use of Social Media for Protest Behavior: The Roles of 
Information, Opinion Expression, and Activism,” American Behavioral Scientist 57, no. 7 
(2013): 920-942. 
34  Jan van Deth, “A conceptual map of political participation,” Acta Politica 49, no. 3 
(2014): 349-367. 
35  Marc Hooghe, “Defining political participation: How to pinpoint an elusive target?,” Acta 
Politica 49, no. 3 (2014): 338-341. 
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Moldova might also experience disaffection with institutions and actors of 
representative democracy, making them more likely to favor political decision-
makers over elected representatives.
36
 Therefore, they would emphasize 
decision-making by citizens and thereby display a preference for participation 
in referendums, public consultations or street protests. Although the 
mobilization thesis argues that access to digital technologies has the capacity to 
draw new participants to the social life, especially younger citizens, studies 
offer mixed results, regarding technologies facilitating reinforcement and 
mobilization of only particular user groups.
37
 
The move made by young people in Moldova is in contrast with the 
generally low civic and political engagement, as it was recorded all over Central 
and Eastern Europe.
38
 Therefore, their engagement in the contentious politics of 
“color revolutions” and the means they use to get mobilized mark a serious split 
between political generations. What we notice today is the gap between values 
and repertories of action of different age groups, based on different socializing 
conditions. This split is visible in political matters, with younger generations 
rather inclined toward Western democratic procedures and values and older 
generations, rather inclined toward Soviet nostalgia, which is regarded as the 
revival of a political system, which was capable of providing consistent social 
and economic benefits. But the split is also visible in proper terms, meaning that 
the public visibility and social influence of age groups vary according to the 
repertoires of action. The more vocal, radical protest manifestations turned 
young people into a group that counts in politics. Their ability to mobilize 
through social media channels, by avoiding classical mass-media channels often 
controlled by the government, compensates their numbers, making them to 
apparently dominate the public space. Their protest may change the political 
agenda, or at least focus the public attention on the issues they support, making 
them visible in the public space in countries from the region.
39
 But when it 
comes to the classical forms of political action, especially voting, they are 
outnumbered. Thus they fail to impose their political views, having to respond 
to the new political settings generated by elections, by engaging in a new 
                                               
36  Sergiu Gherghina and Brigitte Geissel, “Linking Democratic Preferences and Political 
Participation: Evidence from Germany,” Political Studies 65, no. 1, (2017 special 
supplementary issue): 24-42. 
37  Florian Hartleb, “Political participation today: a radical shift, but with positive or negative 
outcome?,” European View 16, no. 2 (2017): 303-311. 
38  Marc M. Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Gabriel Bădescu, Paul E. Sum and Eric M. Uslaner, 
“Civil Society and Democratic Values in Romania and Moldova,” East European Politics 
and Societies 18, no. 2 (2004): 316-341. 
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succession of protests.
40
 This is the apparent mechanism we emphasize here, a 
deep contradiction between political outcomes of different action strategies, 
embraced by people from different generations. Finally, this might explain the 
frustration and disappointment of young people in Moldova, who are reluctant 
to vote, but who are still politically active on the unconventional realm of 
politics. With no significant electoral victory, their protests only add to 
Moldova’s political and social instability, since the protests of young people 
have no force to permanently lead the country towards the West. 
It is not implied that all young people are Western oriented, as they bear 
completely distinct values from their predecessors. As shown in the data 
analysis below, the difference between age groups differs in respect to the 
political issue described by the items from the questionnaires. The difference is 
bigger when it comes to critically assess the performance and prestige of the 
former type of communist rule than it is when the political activism is 
measured. The same applies to the comparison of the sources of political 
information, with young people using the internet for getting informed about 
politics and older generations using rather newspapers and television as the 
main political information source. Knowing this, it is not surprising to notice 
that there are large shares of conservative oriented and Soviet nostalgic young 
people in Moldova, and that there are many young people getting mobilized in 
support of the Communist candidates. 
However, the evolution of Moldova’s situation seems to confirm the 
mechanism of differentiation between young people and other categories, 
especially taking into account their propensity for unconventional forms of 
political participation and the new style of political mobilization. Whereas 
young people do not vote in large shares and do not participate in voluntary 
associations,
41
 including political parties, they engage in politics in the form of 
street protests. By their political action, they even managed to turn down the 
results of the elections held on the 5
th 
of April 2009, won by the Communist 
Party (Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova – PCRM) and to force new 
elections on the 29
th
 of July the same year. Their protest from the 6
th
 and 7
th
 of 
April, directed against the PCRM’s victory with almost 50% of the casted votes, 
is similar with other anti-system demonstrations in the region and often called a 
“Twitter revolution”, due to large mobilization through SMS sent by cellphones 
and through social-media channels,
42
 in order to avoid state-owned mass media 
controlled by PCRM. What PCRM has initially expected, namely another 
comfortable electoral victory following the previous 2001 and 2005 elections,
43
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which transformed their shares of votes into a solid majority of parliamentary 
mandates, turned into a political defeat when confronted with thousands of 
young people gathered in the central square of the capital Chișinău to protest 
against the alleged electoral fraud. 
In 2009, it was not only the parliamentary majority necessary to support 
the government at stake, but a special majority required to elect the president, 
namely three fifths of the deputies, 61 of the 101 parliamentary seats. Since 
PCRM won only 60 seats, it failed to automatically appoint its own candidate. 
However, the emotion triggered by the protest that took place following the 
elections lead to a long period of uncertainty, failed presidential elections, snap 
parliamentary elections, unstable parliamentary majorities, three successive 
interim presidents from 2009 to 2012, and to the election of a non-affiliated 
president between 2012 and 2016. When the popular election of the president 
was put in place in October 2016, PCRM candidate Igor Dodon won the second 
round of the elections with more than 52% against Maia Sandu, the candidate of 
the Alliance for European Integration (Alianța pentru Integrare Europeană – 
AIE), a broad alliance of parties opposing to PCRM. 
The electoral strength of the Socialist Party, the PCRM successor, was 
decisive, and the foreign policy of Moldova shifted once again, with a renewed 
interest for close collaboration with the Russian Federation, adding a new 
switch to Moldova’s indefinite balance between East and West. The success of 
the PCRM candidate was due, among other factors, to a mobilization of young 
people, grouped under the umbrella of a youth association called the “Young 
Guard”. They were active in many social, cultural and educational projects and 
worked as a youth branch of the party. Following the 2016 presidential 
elections, the political landscape has fragmented, with the governing Democrat 
Party (Partidul Democrat din Moldova – PDM) distancing itself from its 
previous allies from the AIE and forming in 2108, with the help of several 
former PCRM MPs, the biggest party group in parliament. Following the 
February 2019 parliamentary elections, PDM won a third of the parliamentary 
mandates and started negotiations for a new governing coalition. 
  
 
Methods and Data 
 
Are young people really different from older generations? Do they differ 
by their shared values, or by the repertoires of political action? How do they 
assess the Soviet past? In the context of the 6
th
 and 7
th
 April 2009 protests, how 
did they get mobilized and how do they evaluate the political crisis? A valuable 
series of surveys (Public Opinion Barometers – POB) conducted in Moldova at 
the request of the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) will be used for this purpose. 
                                                                                                                   
Graeme P. Herd, “Moldova Between Europe and Russia: Inoculating Against the Colored 
Contagion?,” Post-Soviet Affairs 22, no. 4 (2006): 349-379. 
Young People and Political Activism in Moldova 335 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIX  no. 3 & 4 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is not easy to evaluate all those research items in a comprehensive manner, 
but in this case, all those aspects have been gathered in two separate surveys, 
which measure their evolution in time. The first survey was conducted in 
November 2009 by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys from Chișinău, using 
a representative sample for the electoral population of 1118 respondents.
44
 The 
second survey was conducted in October 2016, before the presidential elections, 
by the Center for Social Investigations and Marketing CBS-AXA, on a representative 
sample for the electoral population in Moldova counting 1109 respondents.
45
 
 
 
Generational Differences and Regime Support 
  
The alternatives to democracy underlined by Rose, Mishler and 
Haerpfer
46
 are a strong leader, who does not bother too much with political 
parties and elections, the rule of the military, and a technocratic regime, formed 
by specialists who decide about public issues.
47
 Although the support for the 
last option, namely the technocratic government, may cover the public need for 
efficiency and the sincere hope for fairness, it is a non-democratic alternative 
still, because it avoids confronting with citizens’ opinions and preferences. As 
mentioned above, those alternatives form the counter-definition of democracy, 
imagined as a competitive regime. All those alternatives are not only plausible, 
but already experienced in various degrees and forms by citizens from post-
communist societies. Those non-democratic alternatives have been used by the 
New Democracies Barometer (NDB) in the early 1990s,
48
 and replicated in 
numerous other surveys conducted in various countries from East Central 
Europe.
49
 
Another alternative is plausible in Moldova, which has not been 
mentioned by NDB, namely the revival of the Soviet Union. This alternative is 
possible under the political configuration of the current Russia-Belarus-
                                               
44  Institutul de Politici Publice Chișinău, Barometrul Opiniei Publice – noiembrie 2009, 
accessed February 8, 2017, http://ipp.md/old/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=450. 
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Kazakhstan Union or in another format. It is meant here, that the return to a 
revived Soviet Union and a socialist state is by far more plausible in Moldova 
that it is in other post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
As already mentioned, Soviet nostalgia mainly relates to the social benefits and 
the economic conditions provided by the regime, ranging from specific housing 
conditions, food supply, and the medical assistance to the educational system, 
the pension system or the job availability, by including more general conditions 
as public order or living standards. Therefore, many Moldovan citizens regret 
the breakdown of the past Soviet regime. They support the return to the 
previous regime and to state socialism and, if given the chance, even cast a vote 
in a referendum for the inclusion of Moldova in a revived Soviet Union (see 
Table 1). 
The revival of the former Soviet Union, seen as a non-democratic 
alternative, is supported by citizens in accordance to political attitudes, 
economic influences and human capital. Unsurprisingly, Moldovan citizens 
willing to return to the previous Soviet-style regime are especially those who 
really experienced this political regime. In this respect, supporting the non-
democratic alternative is very much a remembrance of “good old days”. The 
consistency of the support in time, when we compare the 2009 and the 2016 
surveys, is also remarkable. The regret for the breakdown of the Soviet Union is 
constant, as is the willingness to cast a vote in a referendum for including 
Moldova into a revived Soviet Union. 
What seems to count is not only the generational differences, which are 
not a surprise,
50
 but their transposition into political preferences and forms of 
political action. Alongside Soviet nostalgia, another political attitude is the 
expectation for Moldova's position in the international arena, with the 
competing prospects for either EU integration, or the membership in a political 
union lead by Russia. Those external choices turn into political preferences, 
with Soviet nostalgic people voting with PCRM and the supporters of the EU 
integration voting mainly with AIE. 
As mentioned above, Soviet nostalgia is strengthened by the current 
social and economic situation, marked by deprivation and uncertainty. 
Therefore, the subjective evaluation of the current household situation, as well 
as the estimation for future living standards could influence the support for this 
alternative. Finally, human capital is important in shaping attitudes toward 
political regimes since it could be seen as resources people can use in the social 
environment, resources that can be exchanged for economic resources. 
Education, gender, age and ethnicity are important for the way people conceive 
and relate to political regimes. This set of factors is tested for evaluating the 
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support for the return of the Soviet Union on the basis of the 2009 and 2016 
surveys (see Table 2). 
The revival of the former Soviet Union, as plausible non-democratic 
attitude, is supported by citizens with clear political attitudes, those who 
observe how things in Moldova head in a wrong direction and those who vote 
with PCRM. Regarding their economic evaluations and their resources, they are 
not the winners of the post-communist transition. On the contrary, those who 
would like to see the Soviet Union back again are exactly those people who 
experienced the difficulties of transition and are the least satisfied with their 
living standards (see Table 2). They are the least fitted to win the social 
competition, because they lack personal resources that could be exchanged, 
namely they are undereducated, older people and less integrated into the 
national framework, being part of ethnic minority groups. It is worth 
mentioning that Moldova still experiences a more complex transition that other 
former communist countries, since nationhood and state-building have been 
added as new challenges to the more classical political and economic transition, 
encompassing democratic institutional design and free market regulations.
51
 
Moreover, Moldova still has to define nationhood by solving the difficult issue 
of ethnic identification with ethnic Romanians and the existence of a separate 
Moldovan nation, in a context marked by the secessionist de-facto state of 
Transnistria, which works forging a separate identity.
52
 Those who desire the 
revival of the Soviet Union and state socialism are therefore those who least 
benefitted from Moldova's independence, national identity building and market 
oriented economy. 
 
 
Political Preferences and Political Action 
 
With generational differences in evaluating the current democracy and 
the past communist regime, it is not surprising to see that political evaluations 
are expressed by different forms of political action and by different political 
preferences. Young people, defined by the sampling stratification of both 
surveys as people aged 18-29 years old, are still interested in politics, with no 
significant differences between youngsters and the elderly. What differs a lot 
are the communication channels that make the political information available. 
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Whereas in 2009 television was the most important source of information for 
almost everybody, the expansion of internet in Moldova made young people 
largely rely on it when it comes to inform themselves about politics. This is not 
surprising, since the internet has become the main source of information for any 
given aspect of life, including social and political matters. In 2009, according to 
the first survey used in this paper, 22% of young people declared the internet as 
the most important source of information, compared with very few older people 
relying on internet for getting informed. In 2016, according to the other survey 
we use here, almost 50% of young people indicated the internet as the most 
important source. Using the serial data collected by the Public Opinion 
Barometers (two surveys every year), it is to be noticed that the daily use of 
internet, for all age groups combined, increased from 24% (POB – May 2010) 
to 50% (POB – April 2016). At the same time, television remained the most 
important information source that ordinary people, all age groups combined, 
rely on. Accessing TV for political information displays a maximum of 91% 
during the electoral campaign in 2009 (POB – March 2009) and a minimum of 
78% before the electoral campaign in 2016 (POB – November 2016). However, 
the importance assigned to this information channel changed dramatically for 
young people, who dropped TV as the main information channel (66.9%, POB 
– November 2009, to 36.1%, POB – October 2016). Young people turned to 
internet instead not only to get connected, but to get informed as well, as shown 
in the Table 3. 
The internet use is strongly related to the age of users, in part because of 
their ability to use new devices and to connect them to the internet. This 
technical and cultural aspect also translates into a differentiation in content 
access and, finally, into political preferences. When asked in November 2009 
about the political neutrality of the state-run Radio and TV broadcasting 
company, only 28% of young people agreed with it, compared with 40% of 
people aged 60 years old or more. At the same time, 35% of the young people 
questioned indicated that PCRM benefited of preferential news exposure, 
compared with only 7% of people aged 60 years old or more. The same 
difference can be stated when it comes to assess political parties' access to 
Moldova 1, the main state TV channel. Almost 27% of young people mentioned 
that the access was strictly permitted only for PCRM, with only 8.5% of people 
aged 60 years old or more agreeing with the statement. 
The exposure to different informational content by the use of different 
information channels, therefore getting access to unrestricted news and political 
opinions, only increased young people's feelings that elections, in general, are 
not at all free and fair. In fact, 55% of young people questioned in November 
2009 agreed with this, compared with only 28% of people aged 60 years old or 
more. This might explain why young people contested in the streets the 
elections held in early April 2009 and why they mobilized to protest by means 
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of new media, which were not supervised by any government agency. As in 
other contentious movements in the region, social media and various internet 
sites at least favored the activation and facilitated the role of already constituted 
social networks during effective mobilization, by diffusing information and 
framing protest claims.
53
 In this respect, the protest mobilization in Moldova 
can easily be labelled as a “Twitter revolution”, due to the large scale use of 
social media in covering the events and helping mobilizing young people.
54
 Not 
surprisingly, young people and older people point towards different political 
forces in charge of the political turmoil triggered by mass protests in April 
2009, with almost 40% of young people blaming PCRM and almost 28% of 
people aged 60 years old or more blaming AIE in response. 
However, the succession of several ad-interim presidents, as well as the 
election of a non-affiliated president between 2012 and 2016, somewhat eroded 
the differences between age groups regarding the evaluation of free and fair 
elections. In 2016, a share of 79.8% of young people and 73.2% of people aged 
60 years old or more labelled Moldovan elections as unfair. The repertoires of 
political action however have not changed. As already acknowledged, the use of 
internet among young people may strongly facilitate protest mobilization.
55
 In 
turn, protest as a new form of political activism is embraced especially by 
young people. This biased selection of protesters by special internet exposure 
strengthens the differences in public visibility. Whereas older people express 
themselves mainly by conventional forms of participation, young people 
politically engage rather through new forms of political action. Whereas the 
latter seem to be the first to burn stages in political learning and expression 
during transition,
56
 the former are still attached to forms of participation that 
have been prohibited during communist times. This is by no means limited to 
Moldova, but a common figure in post-communist countries. 
Quick on-line protest mobilization of young people tends to collide with 
more conventional voting and party membership of older people, in a general 
context marked by low levels of participation.
57
 Protest activism was measured 
by the 2016 Moldovan survey as an aggregated scale of six distinct activities, 
namely signing a petition, taking part in legal street rallies and strikes, taking 
part in illegal street demonstrations and strikes, occupying public buildings or 
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factories, blocking streets, and finally, going on a hunger strike. The protest 
scale is correlated, in the Moldovan survey, to the use of internet sites as main 
source of information (Pearson R = .099, p < .001, N = 1093). This only 
confirms why and how young people manage to overpass state-media, very 
often controlled by the government, by relying on an alternative information 
channel. Protest could be influenced, therefore, by political preferences, 
attitudes regarding the personal welfare and by rather structural, heavy factors, 
as education, gender, residence, ethnicity or age (see Table 4). 
As shown in the Table 4, political attitudes are essential in shaping 
protest activism. Those who protest do not vote with the Communist party and 
they reject the revival of the former USSR and of state socialism. They are more 
educated, and mostly live in cities. Since education is generally related to 
urbanization, when the urban residence predictor is removed from the statistical 
model, education becomes a salient issue in making a difference between those 
who protest and those who don’t. The findings fit in the broader picture of 
young activists who protest. This type of activism tends to replace the more 
classical forms of political action, under the general influence of new 
communication patterns and specific information exposure. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Young people’s sudden outburst in condition of political stress, street 
protest and overt government contestation may be in contradiction with the 
electoral legitimacy acquired by political parties through fair or less fair 
elections. This issue only adds to the political instability in Moldova, where 
more visible, active and highly vocal young people managed to contest 
parliamentary elections in April 2009 in order to force the indirect election of a 
pro-European president (by the parliament), only to be once again defeated at 
polls in 2016, with the Socialist Party (former PCRM) victorious presidential 
candidate largely voted by older people. This permanent instability not only 
undermines clear cut foreign affairs options, but democratic consolidation as 
well. In fact, regime choice and foreign political orientations are closely related 
in Moldova. The non-democratic alternative to incipient democracy is by no 
means a theoretical possibility, but a living political regime, under the form of a 
revived Soviet Union. The possibility of such a revival is closer to reality today 
than it was after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, due to Russia’s efforts to 
modernize, and to restore its regional influence and its global status of a super-
power. 
The return of a Socialist president to power in 2016 highlights the 
uncertain democratization and the fragile change made by street protests back in 
2009. Despite some political advances towards democratic stability and pro-
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European commitments, despite stronger political and economic ties with the 
European Union set up under more favorable circumstances by the pro-
European governments, the election of Igor Dodon as president marks a new 
turn in Moldovan politics. The favorable circumstances generated by street 
protests have been overturned by solid structural factors. One of these factors is 
the generational gap. As underlined in this article, the differences in regime 
support are due to different political options. Different political options are 
connected with different styles and repertoires of political action. Young people 
not only display different attitudes, but they get politically mobilized by 
different agencies. Street protests make their voice heard, but this is not enough. 
Although mass rallies make young people seem a political force that has to be 
taken into account, their reluctance to get engaged in more conventional forms 
of participation is a serious weakness. There is no surprise that they are 
outnumbered at polls. It is true, their electoral fragility is due to a large series of 
structural factors pertaining to ageing and migration, yet their lack of 
involvement in conventional political action is a serious obstacle for 
democratization. Besides protesting, which is largely contextual and 
intermittent, young people have to be involved in secondary organizations, 
which could turn to “schools of democracy”
58
 in the long run. In Moldova, 
however, participation to voluntary associations is scant.
59
 A stronger civil 
society would help consolidate democracy, by making young people and other 
citizens engaged in collective actions that could overpass internal divisions in 
Moldova. Moreover, a stronger civil society could, on the long run, decisively 
turn Moldova from appealing non-democratic alternatives. With young people 
only contextually mobilized in mass rallies, and for short periods of time, 
democracy in Moldova will continue to remain fragile. Their sudden outburst in 
street protests will only add to the general instability, keeping Moldova in a 
permanent state of unconsolidated, partial democracy. 
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Annexes 
 
Table 1. Attitudes toward the former Soviet Union: Percentage of responses 
Year / age 
groups 
18-29 30-44 45-59 60+  
2009      
Regret the 
Soviet 
Union 
breakdown 
25.1 50.5 57.3 60.7 
Eta = .221 
p < .001 
N = 1118 
Desire the 
revival of 
USSR and 
of state 
socialism 
22.5 41.9 44.5 52.6 
Eta = .137 
p < .001 
N = 1118 
Would vote 
in favor of a 
new Soviet 
Union 
25.2 43.0 50.3 56.1 
Eta = .143 
p < .001 
N = 1117 
2016      
Regret the 
Soviet 
Union 
breakdown 
26.1 56.9 69.8 68.9 
Eta = .343 
p < .001 
N = 1107 
Desire the 
revival of 
USSR and 
of state 
socialism 
29.8 45.5 59.5 54.2 
Eta = .196 
p < .001 
N = 1107 
Would vote 
in favor of a 
new Soviet 
Union 
32.4 48.2 56.4 55.5 
Eta = .141 
p < .001 
N = 1107 
Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data. 
 
Table 2. Regression models for the revival of USSR and of state socialism (only 
standardized coefficients Beta are shown) 
 2009 2016 
 Beta Beta 
Things in the country head in a wrong direction .123** .082* 
Votes PCRM .415*** .336*** 
Satisfaction with the living standard -.156*** -.039 
Expectation for future living standard -.065 -.065 
Sex (M) -.036 -.029 
Education level -.188*** -.152*** 
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Ethnicity (Romanian/Moldovan) -.009 -.092* 
Age groups .070 .091* 
R square .453 .218 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data. 
 
Table 3. Attitudes toward information sources in 2016: Percentage of responses 
Age groups 18-29 30-44 45-59 60+  
TV is the 
main source 
of 
information 
36.1 59.2 72.7 78.7 
Eta = .165 
p < .001 
N = 1108 
Internet is the 
main source 
of 
information 
49.6 23.3 13.0 1.2 
Access news 
from internet 
news sites 
39.7 23.2 10.7 2.8 
Eta = .343 
p < .001 
N = 1108 
Access news 
from social 
media 
channels 
25.0 12.9 7.9 .8 
Eta = .265 
p < .001 
N = 1107 
Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data. 
 
Table 4. Regression models for protest activism in 2016 (only standardized 
coefficients Beta are shown) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Beta Beta 
Votes PCRM -.142** -.136** 
Desire the revival of USSR and of state socialism -.099* -.144* 
Satisfaction with the living standard -.037 -.037 
Expectation for future living standard -.030 -.027 
Sex (M) .044 .034 
Ethnicity (Romanian/Moldovan) -.002 -.022 
Education level .068 .091* 
Age groups -.021 -.037 
Urban residence .132**  
R square .075 .059 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
Source: This table was made by the authors based on the analyzed collected data. 
